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IS WHISTLEBLOWING PROTECTION AVAILABLE UNDER
TITLE IX?: AN HERMENEUTICAL DIVIDE AND THE ROLE
OF COURTS
JOHN A. GRAY*
Our role, then, is not "to provide such remedies as
are necessary to make effective the congressional
purpose'expressed by a statute," but to examine the
text of what Congress enacted into law.1
Every nomination to the Court can make a
tremendous difference in the outcome of real cases
affecting real people for decades to come.'
INTRODUCTION
One blows a whistle to get attention and to cause something to
stop - as a referee in a sports contest or a person physically
threatened by another. Whistleblowing as a metaphor refers to the
act of disclosing information concerning conduct within or by an
organization that the whistleblower believes to be unethical, illegal,
or dangerous with the intent of having the conduct reviewed and
stopped? Whistleblowing occurs in two contexts; internal whistle-
blowing involves disclosure to higher authorities within an organi-
zation, and external whistleblowing involves disclosure to outside
enforcement authorities and/or the press. Legal protection for
whistleblowers does not prevent them from suffering adverse
employment consequences.4 Rather, the law only provides them a
* Professor of Law and Social Responsibility, Sellinger School of Business and
Management, Loyola College in Maryland.
1. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1515 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275,287 (2001) (quoting J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 433 (1964))).
2. Press Release, Nat'l Women's Law Center, NWLC Applauds Supreme Court's
Decision in Title IX Retaliation Case: Court Rules 5-4 in Favor of Girls' Basketball Coach
(Mar. 29, 2005), available at http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=2202&section=
newsroom (quoting Marcia D. Greenberger, NWLC Co-President).
3. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1627 (8th ed. 1999) (defining whistleblower as"fain
employee who reports employer wrongdoing to a governmental or law-enforcement
agency').
4. For example, whistleblowers may be shunned by colleagues, lose friends, lose
their jobs, get divorced, or attempt suicide. Marlene Winfield, Whistleblowers as
Corporate Safety Net, in WHISTLEBLOWING - SUBVERSION OR CORPORATE CITIZENSHIP?
21, 21-22 (Gerald Vinten ed., 1994).
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remedy for injuries suffered as a result of whistleblowing.5 A great
variety of laws and enforcement systems exist at both the federal
and state levels. Federal statutes that protect whistleblowers in
certain circumstances include the False Claims Act,6 anti-retaliation
provisions of employment discrimination laws7 and of worker
health' and public health laws,9 the executive branch employees'
whistleblower act,1° and most recently, provisions of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002." As an example of the prevalence of state-level
whistleblower legislation, Maryland has at least four whistleblower
statutes12 in addition to a ruling by its highest court making the tort
of abusive discharge available to individuals who have no other
statutory remedy after being discharged for blowing the whistle to
a public enforcement authority.
13
Legislatures and courts provide remedies to whistleblowers for
a number of reasons. The foremost rationale is two-fold. Whistle-
blowers serve to protect public health and safety, but often suffer
severe adverse employment and career consequences for following
their consciences and acting to protect the public. 4 Thus, whistle-
5. See, e.g., Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (2005); False
Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2005).
6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2005). This post-Civil War statute provides compensation
to employees who provide information to the federal government about fraudulent claims
for payment that leads to successful legal proceedings against their employers. Id. §
3730.
7. E.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2005);
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2005); Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2005). Each of these statutes
includes an express anti-retaliation provision to protect employees who may not be
victims of discriminatory practices in the workplace, but nevertheless oppose or protest
them to their employers. 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2005); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2005); 42 U.S.C.
§ 12203(a) (2005).
8. Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 (2005).
9. E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (2005); Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §
2011 (2005); Clear Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2005); Nuclear Waste Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 10101 (2005).
10. Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note (2005).
11. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified in scattered sections of the
U.S.C. (2005)). Sarbanes-Oxley provides remedies for both internal and external
whistleblowers who work for covered companies and report in good faith what they
reasonably believe to be securities law-related violations. See id. §§ 806, 1107 (codified
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1513(e), 1514A (2005)).
12. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 49b, § 16 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH OCC. §§
1-501 to 1-506 (Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS. & PENS. §§ 5-301 to 5-307
(1997 & Supp. 2003); MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 5-604 (1999).
13. Molesworth v. Brandon, 627 A.2d 608 (Md. 1996); see generally John A. Gray,
Scope of Whistleblower Protection in the State of Maryland: A Comprehensive Statute Is
Needed, 33 U. BALT. L. REV. 225 (2004) (providing an overview of Maryland
whistleblowing law).
14. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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blower protection alleviates the career and financial risks that may
otherwise deter whistleblowing. Other reasons include: (1) that it is
unjust to penalize individuals for reporting what they reasonably
and in good faith believe to be conduct that is not only unethical
and/or illegal but also sufficiently dangerous to others, physically or
economically, that it must be stopped; (2) that many, perhaps most,
people would be reluctant to jeopardize their own jobs and careers
in the absence of legal protection; and (3) that the public would
suffer more injuries in the absence of legal protection for whistle-
blowers.
The issue of the availability of whistleblower protection has
recently surfaced, this time with respect to Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972'5 in the case of Jackson v. Birmingham Board
of Education.6 The Supreme Court first recognized a private right
of action to enforce Title IX's prohibition against sex discrimination
in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance in
1979 in Cannon v. University of Chicago.7 The question before the
Court in Jackson was whether Title IX includes a prohibition of and
a remedy for retaliation against those who complain of discrimina-
tion based on sex, including complainers who are not victims of the
discrimination that is the subject matter of the complaint. 8 In a
closely divided five to four decision on March 29, 2005, the Supreme
Court held that Title IX prohibits retaliation against whistleblowers
and provides a private right of action in such a situation.'9
The importance of the Jackson decision also lies in its clear
illustration of the hermeneutical divide between Supreme Court
justices on statutory construction and, by implication, the signifi-
cance of the appointment of judges who are either textualist or
contextualist in their approach to statutory construction.
I. HISTORY OF THE CASE
In 1993, the Birmingham Board of Education hired Roderick
Jackson as a physical education teacher and girls' basketball
coach.2" In August of 1999, Jackson was transferred to Ensley High
School where he continued working in both capacities.2 Jackson
15. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2005).
16. 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
17. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
18. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1502.
19. Id.
20. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1335 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
21. Id.
20061 673
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noticed differences in the treatment of the girls' and boys' basketball
teams.22 The girls practiced in the old gym with wooden backboards
and bent rims, while the boys practiced in the new gym.2" The girls'
junior varsity team was eliminated, while the boys' was not.24
Additionally, the girls did not have access to ice during their
practices, although the boys did.2" The boys' team also received all
of the revenue generated from admissions and concessions at games,
while the girls' team received none of the revenues generated at
their games.26 Jackson complained to his high school's authorities.27
Shortly thereafter, he began to receive negative job performance
evaluations.2" In May of 2001, he was relieved of his coaching duties,
but not of his teaching duties because he had tenure as a physical
education teacher.2" Jackson concluded that he was fired as coach
in retaliation for voicing his concerns about the unequal treatment
of the girls' basketball team at Ensley High School. °
Jackson sued the Birmingham Board of Education for compen-
sation and injunctive relief, claiming that his dismissal was in
retaliation for his whistleblowing in violation of Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972."1 Jackson argued that sections
90132 and 902 s3 of Title IX, together with an anti-retaliation
22. Id.
23. Marcia D. Greenberger, Don't Penalize Coach for Standing up for Players,




27. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1335.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1335-36.
31. Id. at 1335.
32. Section 901 of Title IX, in relevant part, provides that "[n]o person in the United
States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005).
33. Section 902 of Title IX states, in relevant part:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any education program or activity ... is
authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of section 901 with
respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders
of general applicability .... Compliance with any requirement adopted
pursuant to this section may be effected (1) by the termination of or refusal
to grant or to continue assistance under such program or activity to any
recipient as to whom there has been an express finding ... , of a failure to
comply with such requirement..., or (2) by any other means authorized by
law ....
20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2005).
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regulation promulgated by the Department of Education,34 implied
a right to a private cause of action and a private remedy.35 In its
defense, the School Board argued that Title IX did not provide a
private cause of action for someone in Jackson's position because it
applied only to individuals who were themselves the victims of the
alleged gender discrimination. 6 The Board moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that Title IX's private cause of action does not
include claims of retaliation. 7 According to the Board's interpreta-
tion of Title IX enforcement, the Office of Civil Rights of the
Department of Education could act to remedy any gender discrimi-
nation, and the girls could sue under Title IX, but their coach could
not.38
34. Using the authority vested in it by section 902, the Department of Education
promulgated 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), which prohibits retaliation against anyone who
complains of a Title IX violation:
No recipient [of federal funds] or other person shall intimidate, threaten,
coerce, or discriminate against any individual for the purpose of interfering
with any right or privilege secured by section [901 of Title IX] or this part,
or because he has made a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in
any manner in an investigation, proceeding or hearing under this part.
34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (incorporated to Title IX by 34 C.F.R. § 106.71 (2005)).
35. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1336.
36. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27596, at *3 (N.D.
Ala. Jan. 10, 2002), aff'd, 309 F.3d 1333, 1336 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 125 S. Ct. 1497
(2005).
37. Id.
38. Id. at *4. Assuming, for a moment, that Title IX would not provide a private cause
of action to Jackson, the question arises whether alternative theories of recovery might
be available to Jackson. Possible avenues for recovery to explore include Title VII, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, and the tort of abusive discharge.
Title VII would not be available to Jackson because the subject matter of his
complaints was not gender discrimination in violation of Title VII either against his
students or against himself: the adverse employment action taken against Jackson was
not because of his sex, and his students did not face discrimination in employment. See
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2005).
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 would apply if Jackson instead had complained to the
Office of Civil Rights and then had been fired in retaliation by the School Board because
section 1107 criminalizes retaliation against an informant who provided truthful
information relating to the commission of any federal offense to a law enforcement
officer. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, 18 U.S.C. § 1513(e) (2005). Jackson, however,
only complained internally. Sarbanes-Oxley section 806(a), on the other hand, provides
a statutory remedy to the victim of a retaliatory employment act only to employees of
publicly traded companies and only for reporting securities related offenses. Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2005). Thus, neither provision of
Sarbanes-Oxley would protect Jackson because he was an internal whistleblower and
he did not report a securities offense as an employee of a publicly traded company.
In a few jurisdictions, the tort of abusive discharge may be available. See, e.g.,
Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merchandising Corp., 551 F. Supp. 544, 547 (S.D.N.Y.
1982) ("New York courts, at least implicitly, have recognized a tort for abusive discharge
under the following special circumstances - (1) when the discharge is for reasons
contrary to the public policy of the state, and perhaps (2) when the discharge is
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Both the District Court for the Northern District of Alabama
39
and the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit4 ° agreed with the
School Board's argument. Before both of these courts, Jackson
argued his case pro se, but the National Women's Law Center4
joined him in his petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court.42
Because Title IX covers all public and private schools at all educa-
tional levels (primary, secondary, and postsecondary) that receive,
directly or indirectly, federal financial assistance,43 the case takes
on heightened importance as to the issues of whether protection is
limited to victims and whether retaliatory acts are covered.
II. CONFLICT AMONG THE CIRCUITS
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson, two circuits
had issued conflicting decisions on the case's central question. The
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Jackson" found no protection
for retaliation under Title IX, whereas the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals, in Peters v. Jenney,45 found that the implied private cause
of action found in Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196446 included
retaliation claims.47 Though the cases concerned distinct statutes,
they were conflicting because the Court has consistently construed
the statutes jointly as Title IX was "explicitly patterned" after Title
Vl.48
unconscionable or (3) when it is solely based on a malicious motive. Kovalesky has made
sufficient allegations to bring herself within the protection of this body of the New York
tort law."). In other jurisdictions, such as Maryland, the tort is available to provide a
remedy only to external whistleblowers. See Gray, supra note 13, at 237.
39. Jackson, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27596 at *3.
40. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1347 (11th Cir. 2002), rev'd,
125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
41. The National Women's Law Center's mission is "to protect and advance the
progress of women and girls at work, in school, and in virtually every aspect of their
lives." National Women's Law Center Homepage, http://www.nwlc.org (last visited Mar.
8, 2006).
42. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct.
1497 (2005) (No. 02-1672).
43. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(c) (2005).
44. 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).
45. 327 F.3d 307 (4th Cir. 2003).
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d-7 (2005). Whereas Title IX prohibits discrimination on
the basis of sex in educational programs that receive federal financial assistance, 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005), Title VI prohibits discrimination "on the ground of race, color,
or national origin" in any program or activity that receives federal financial assistance.
42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2005).
47. Peters, 327 F.3d at 310.
48. Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 693 n.14, 694-98 (1979); see also Barnes
v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) ("[The Court has interpreted Title VI consistently
with Title IX .... ").
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The Eleventh Circuit decision in Jackson v. Birmingham Board
of Education49 relied on the earlier decision of Alexander v. Sand-
oval,"° in which the Supreme Court held that Title VI's private right
of action does not extend to private enforcement of the disparate-
impact regulations promulgated under the act.5" The Eleventh
Circuit looked to Sandoval to resolve the issue of the authoritative-
ness of statutory language over regulatory language:
Like substantive federal law itself, private rights of action to
enforce federal law must be created by Congress. The judicial
task is to interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine
whether it displays an intent to create not just a private right
but also a private remedy. Statutory intent on this latter point is
determinative. Without it, a cause of action does not exist and
courts may not create one, no matter how desirable that might
be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.
Raising up causes of action where a statute has not created them
may be a proper function for common-law courts, but not for
federal tribunals.52
The Eleventh Circuit further noted that Sandoval "clearly
delimits the sources that are relevant to our search for legislative
intent" in three steps: 3
49. 309 F.3d 1333 (2002).
50. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
51. Id. at 293. The lone circuit decision that addressed this question prior to
Sandoval is Lowrey v. Texas A & M University Systems. 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
The Fifth Circuit held in Lowrey that 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) can of its own force provide the
basis for an implied private right of action for retaliation suffered by individuals not
themselves the victims of gender discrimination. Id. at 254. To reach this conclusion, it
relied on an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion that had observed that "civil remedies may be
implied from regulations, as well as statutes." Gomez v. Fla. State Employment Serv.,
417 F.2d 569, 576 n.29 (5th Cir. 1969). Ignoring the text contained in sections 901 and
902 of Title IX and focusing exclusively on 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e), the court in Lowrey
applied the four-part Cort test to reach its conclusion that § 100.7(e) implies a private
right of action. Lowrey, 117 F.3d at 250 (citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). The court
relied particularly on the third Cort factor - finding that "the implication of a private
right of action for retaliation would serve the dual purposes of title IX, by creating an
incentive for individuals to expose violations of title IX and by protecting such
whistleblowers from retaliation." Id. at 254 (footnote omitted).
The Eleventh Circuit expressly reviewed and rejected Lowrey in Jackson when it
wrote, "[a]fter Sandoval, we believe the reasoning in Lowrey is unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we do not follow Lowrey, either in its exclusive reliance on 34 C.F.R. §
100.7(e) to imply a private right of action, or in its application of the Cort factors that
gives short shrift to legislative intent." Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1348 n.15 (citations
omitted).
52. Id. at 1340 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001)).
53. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1340 (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 288, and Tex. & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39 (1916)).
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First . .. , we look to the statutory text for "'rights-creating'
language,"... language identifying 'the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted.'...
Second, we examine the statutory structure within which
the provision in question is embedded. If the statutory structure
provides a discernible enforceable mechanism, Sandoval teaches
us that we ought not imply a private right of action because
"[tihe express provision of one method of enforcing a substantive
rule suggests that Congress intended to preclude others." 4
Third, if (and only if) statutory text and structure have not
conclusively resolved [the issue], we turn to the legislative
history and context within which a statute was passed. We
examine legislative history with a skeptical eye . . . because
"[t]he bar for showing legislative intent is high. 'Congressional
intent to create a private right of action will not be presumed.
There must be clear evidence of Congress's intent to create a
cause of action."' 55
Using this hermeneutical template, the Eleventh Circuit first
examined the text of section 901. "Nothing in the text indicates any
congressional concern with retaliation . . . . Indeed, the statute
makes no mention of retaliation at all. . . . The absence of any
mention of retaliation in Title IX therefore weighs powerfully
against a finding that Congress intended Title IX to reach retalia-
tory conduct."56 The text of section 902"7 contains no rights-creating
language and instead explicitly focuses on the power of federal
agencies to regulate recipients of federal funding and provides an
enforcement mechanism subject to judicial review.58 "Section 902's
provision of an administrative enforcement mechanism.., strongly
counsels against inferring a private right of action against retalia-
tion, because '[t]he express provision of one method ... suggests
that Congress intended to preclude others."'59 The Eleventh Circuit
found that neither the text nor the structure of sections 901 and 902
suggested Congressional intent to create a private right of action for
retaliation.6 ° The court further concluded that regulating language
in 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(c) did not "imply such a private right of action
54. Id. (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290).
55. Id. at 1341 (quoting McDonald v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 291 F.3d 718, 723
(11th Cir. 1997)).
56. Id. at 1344-45 (citation omitted).
57. 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2005).
58. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1345.
59. Id. at 1345 (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 290).
60. Id.
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or create a private remedy[,] . . . for the simple reason that
'[1]anguage in a regulation ... may not create a right that Congress
has not."''
In direct opposition to the Eleventh Circuit's interpretation, the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Peters v. Jenney that a
plaintiff can sue for retaliation under Title VI in certain circum-
stances.62 The Fourth Circuit examined the language of section
601 of Title VI and developed a twofold basis for its conclusion.
First, the court relied on an analogy to the interpretations of 42
U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982.3 Section 1982 was interpreted in Sullivan
v. Little Huntington Park,' and § 1981 was interpreted in Fiedler v.
Marumsco Christian School.65 In the Fourth Circuit's view, the
language of§ 1981 and § 1982 was similar to the language in section
601 because both sets of statutes refer only to intentional discrimi-
nation without separately referring to retaliation. The court relied
on this precedent, which "stands for the proposition that a prohibi-
tion on discrimination should be judicially construed to include an
implicit prohibition on retaliation against those who oppose the
prohibited discrimination." 66 Furthermore, the Fourth Circuit cited
these interpretations not only as authority for implying a prohibi-
tion on retaliation but also for the proposition that a private cause
of action is available to those who engage in protected opposition
under those statutes.67
The Fourth Circuit's second basis for holding that retaliation
was prohibited under section 601 was its conclusion that the section
601 regulation' was a reasonable interpretation of the statutory
ban against intentional discrimination entitled to Chevron69
deference.7 ° Therefore, the interpretation is enforceable in a private
61. Id. at 1346 (quoting Sandoval, 532 U.S. at 291).
62. 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003). But cf. Mock v. South Dakota Bd. of Regents,
267 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021-22 (D.S.D. 2003) (critiquing and declining to follow Peters).
63. Peters, 327 F.3d at 317. The court noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 "grant[s] to all
citizens.., the same rights to transact in property 'as enjoyed by white citizens"' and
that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 "prohibits only intentional discrimination and makes no separate
reference to retaliation." Id.
64. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
65. 631 F.2d 1144 (4th Cir. 1980).
66. Peters, 327 F.3d at 317.
67. Id.; see also Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237 (holding that "there can be no question"
that a white plaintiff subjected to adverse action for attempting to sell property to a
black man may bring an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982); Fiedler, 631 F.2d at 1149
(holding that white students who were injured because of association with black students
have statutory standing to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
68. 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(e) (2005); see also Peters, 327 F.3d at 319.
69. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
70. Peters, 327 F.3d at 319.
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action.7' The court relied on the Sandoval holding72 that regulations
applying section 601's ban on intentional discrimination, if valid and
reasonable under the Chevron standard, are enforceable in a private
action.73 The Fourth Circuit held that "the retaliation regulations
are enforceable via an implied private right of action to the extent
that they forbid retaliation for opposing practices that one reason-
ably believes are made unlawful by § 601." "
To assist the district court on remand, the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the elements of a Title VI retaliation claim:
To make a claim for Title VI retaliation, Peters must show (1)
that she engaged in protected activity; (2) that Appellees took a
material adverse employment action against her, and (3) that a
causal connection existed between the protected activity and the
adverse action. As in other civil rights contexts, to show
"protected activity," the plaintiff in a Title VI retaliation case
need "only... prove that he opposed an unlawful employment
practice which he reasonably believed had occurred or was
occurring." The inquiry is therefore (1) whether Peters "subjec-
tively (that is, in good faith) believed" that the district had
engaged in a practice violative of § 601, and (2) whether this
belief "was objectively reasonable in light of the facts," a stan-
dard which we will refer to as one of "reasonable belief." 75
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S JACKSON DECISION
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the
conflict in the circuits over whether a private cause of action based
on a complaint of discrimination encompasses claims of retaliation.76
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 284 (2001) (citing Chevron 467 U.S. at 834-
44 (1984)).
74. Peters, 327 F.3d at 319 (citation omitted). The Fourth Circuit noted "that the
Eleventh Circuit's opinion in [Jackson] did not consider the impact of Sullivan and its
progeny on the question [decided] today." Id. at 318 n.10.
75. Id. at 320 (citations omitted) (quoting Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Co., 291 F.3d 1307,
1312 (11th Cir. 2002)). Judge Widener dissented on the grounds that plaintiff did not
prove that she belonged to the class of persons Congress intended to protect under Title
VI. Id. at 325 (Widener, J., dissenting). Relying on the Eleventh Circuit's Jackson
opinion, Judge Widener wrote, "[h]ad Congress intended to extend a private right of
action under Title VI to persons other than victims of discrimination it knew how to do
so.... Unlike Title VII, Title VI... protects actual victims ... ." Id.
76. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1503 (2005). The fourteen
amicus curiae briefs include: Brief of Amici Curiae National School Boards Association
et al. in Support of Respondent, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Pacific Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497
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The history of Title IX enforcement has had four stages. The
first was the agency enforcement scheme created by the Education
Amendments of 1972.77 The second was the controversy over
whether Title IX's prohibition against gender discrimination applied
only to specific programs that received federal financial assistance
or to the whole institutions of which the recipient programs were a
part. This issue was critical to sports programs because they are not
direct recipients. Congress resolved this question by expressly
applying Title IX to the institution as a whole through its enactment
of the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,78 in effect overruling the
Supreme Court's ruling to the contrary in Grove City College v.
Bell.79 The third stage included both the Court's recognition in
Cannon v. University of Chicago8' of a private cause of action to
(No. 02-1672); Brief of the State of Alabama et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Respondent, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Amicus Curiae Brief of National
Wrestling Coaches Association in Support of Respondent, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No.
02-1672); Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in
Support of Respondent, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Amicus Curiae Brief of
College Sports Council in Support of Neither Party, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-
1672); Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Amici Curiae Brief of Women's Sports
Foundation, Myra Sadker Advocates, et al. in Support of the Petitioner, Jackson, 125 S.
Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Education Association et al.
in Support of Petitioner, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Brief of Amicus Curiae
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in Support of Petitioner, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497
(No. 02-1672); Brief of Amicus Curiae of Birch Bayh in Support of the Petitioner,
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Brief of Amici Curiae New York Lawyers for the
Public Interest et al. Supporting Petitioner, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672); Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497
(No. 02-1672); Amicus Curiae Brief of the National Partnership for Women & Families
and 31 Other Organizations and Individuals in Support of Petitioner, Jackson, 125 S. Ct.
1497 (No. 02-1672).
77. Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 § 902, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat.
374 (1972) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (2005)).
78. Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1987) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2005)).
Passed in response to a Supreme Court interpretation of Title IX, this Act restores the
broad scope of coverage and clarifies the application of, inter alia, Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972. Id. It specifies that an institution receiving federal
financial assistance is prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex even in a
program or activity that does not directly benefit from such assistance. Id.; see also 20
U.S.C. § 1681 (2005).
79. 465 U.S. 555 (1984) (holding that: (1) Title IX applied to the college, even though
it accepted no direct assistance because it enrolled students who received federal
education grants; (2) for Title IX enforcement purposes, the education program or
activity at the college receiving federal financial assistance was the college's financial
aid program and not the entire college; and (3) federal assistance to the college's
financial aid program could be terminated solely because the college had refused to
execute an assurance of compliance with Title IX).
80. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). The Supreme Court also held that Title IX as enacted in
1972 is in pari materia with Title VI as enacted in 1964. Id. at 694-96.
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enforce Title IX's prohibition of gender discrimination and its
holding in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools"' that private
parties could seek monetary damages. The decision in Jackson is
the fourth stage, extending protection against retaliation to
whistleblowers.
82
Jackson also illustrates a contest of wills83 between justices who
adhere to the textualist approach to statutory interpretation,
articulated in Sandoval," and those who follow a contextualist
approach. Textualists restrict themselves to interpreting the
language of the text and the statutory structure,8 5 whereas the
contextualists in an effort to understand the text, also consider the
legal context at the time of enactment and the purpose of the
statute.8
The differences in their respective hermeneutical approaches
can be seen in the issues dividing them in Jackson, including: (1)
the meaning of "discrimination based on sex," 87 (2) the appropriate-
ness of reliance on Sullivan," (3) the question of consistency with
the method of statutory interpretation and the holding in Sandoval,89
(4) the inference to be drawn from the differences between Title VII
and Title IX,' (5) the extension of protection to "indirect" victims,9'
(6) the appropriateness of relying on the desirability or necessity of
private enforcement to effectuate Title IX's purpose," and (7) the
applicability of the Spending Clause's notice requirements to this
case.93 Did the two sides consider different sources to assert their
81. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Franklin established the right to a private remedy in addition
to the private cause of action recognized in Cannon. Id. at 76. Before Franklin, a plaintiff
was only guaranteed a private right to obtain a public remedy.
82. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497 (2005).
83. The phrasing "contest of wills" is appropriate because of the sharp division of the
Sandoval Court. Justice O'Connor, who voted with the majority of five in Sandoval,
voted in Jackson with the four who had dissented in Sandoval.
84. See, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 (2001) ("We therefore begin
(and find that we can end) our search for Congress's intent with the text and structure
of Title VI.").
85. See, e.g., id.
86. See, e.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (inquiring, to determine if a private
right of action existed, "does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff[,]
... is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such
a remedy or deny one[,] . . . [and] is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy... [?)').
87. See infra notes 161-63 and accompanying text.
88. See infra notes 106-08, 157 and accompanying text.
89. See infra notes 176-81 and accompanying text.
90. See infra notes 164-72 and accompanying text.
91. See infra notes 111-12, 130 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 182-86 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 173-75 and accompanying text.
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choice of meaning or did they interpret the same sources differently?
If the latter, what principles of interpretation were applied?
IV. JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S MAJORITY OPINION: THE CONTEXTUALIST
APPROACH
94
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in Jackson concluded that:
(1) retaliation is a form of intentional discrimination based on sex;95
(2) this holding is "in step with Sandoval['s]" prohibition against
regulations extending Title IX's protection beyond its statutory
limits;9' (3) this broadly worded statute does not require that the
victim of the retaliation must also be the victim of the discrimina-
tion that is the subject matter of the complaint, and its effective
enforcement depends on such complaints;97 and (4) the Spending
Clause's notice requirement is clearly met.98
The first and principal issue that divided the Court was
whether section 901's prohibition of discrimination "on the basis of
sex" 99 should be interpreted to include a prohibition against
retaliation as a form of intentional discrimination, specifically when
the complainer is not a possible victim of the discrimination that is
the subject matter of the complaint. l° The majority's position was
that the section 901 text of Title IX banning discrimination on the
basis of sex should be interpreted broadly to prohibit intentional
discrimination in all its forms.'0 ' Justice O'Connor wrote:
Retaliation against a person because that person has complained
of sex discrimination is another form of intentional sex discrimi-
nation encompassed by Title IX's private cause of action.
Retaliation is, by definition, an intentional act. It is a form of
"discrimination" because the complainant is being subjected to
differential treatment. Moreover, retaliation is discrimination
"on the basis of sex" because it is an intentional response to the
94. Justice Stevens, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined in
the majority opinion. Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 125 S. Ct. 1497, 1501-02
(2005).
95. Id. at 1504.
96. Id. at 1507.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1509.
99. Section 901 of Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on
the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005).
100. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1502, 1507.
101. Id. at 1509.
6832006]
684 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 12:671
nature of the complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination. We
conclude that when a funding recipient retaliates against a
person because he complains of sex discrimination, this consti-
tutes intentional "discrimination" "on the basis of sex," in
violation of Title IX. 102
Next, Justice O'Connor responded to three objections to this
interpretation of the meaning of Title IX's prohibition on sex-based
discrimination sex. The first was that "[tjhe Court of Appeals'
conclusion that Title IX does not prohibit retaliation because the
'statute makes no mention of retaliation' ignores the import of our
repeated holdings construing 'discrimination' under Title IX
broadly." 103 In support of this statement, Justice O'Connor cited two
Title IX cases that each held that section 901's broad prohibition on
discrimination includes sexual harassment, although it also was not
expressly mentioned in the statute.10 4 Second, as for the contrast
with Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1964,105 she noted, "Congress
certainly could have mentioned retaliation in Title IX expressly... [;
however, b]ecause Congress did not list any specific discriminatory
practices in Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice says
nothing about whether it intended that practice to be covered." 06
Third, Justice O'Connor invoked Sullivan °7 as the critical
historical context for determining whether Congress intended to
102. Id. at 1504 (citations omitted).
103. Id. (citation omitted).
104. Justice O'Connor wrote, "a recipient's deliberate indifference to a teacher's sexual
harassment of a student also 'violate[s] Title IX's plain terms."' Id. (quoting Davis v.
Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 643 (1999) (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista
Independent School Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1989))). "Likewise, a recipient's
deliberate indifference to sexual harassment of a student by another student also
squarely constitutes 'discrimination' 'on the basis of sex."' Id. Justice O'Connor also cited
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at
1504
105. Section 704 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 expressly prohibits
retaliation for opposing discrimination in the workplace. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
241, 257 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 (2005)).
106. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505.
107. Id. at 1505:
In Sullivan, we held that [42 U.S.C. § 1982] ... protected a white man who
spoke out against discrimination toward one of his tenants and who suffered
retaliation as a result.... [We upheld Sullivan's cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1982 for "[retaliation] for the advocacy of [the black person's]
cause." Thus, in Sullivan we interpreted a general prohibition on racial
discrimination to cover retaliation against those who advocate the rights of
groups protected by that prohibition.
(citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969)).
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include retaliation within the prohibition of sex discrimination."8
She reasoned:
Congress enacted Title IX just three years after Sullivan
was decided, and accordingly that decision provides a valuable
context for understanding the statute. As we recognized in
Cannon, "it is not only appropriate but also realistic to presume
that Congress was thoroughly familiar with [Sullivan] and that
it expected its enactment [of Title IX] to be interpreted in
conformity with [it]." Retaliation for Jackson's advocacy of the
rights of the girls' basketball team in this case is "discrimina-
tion" "on the basis of sex," just as retaliation for advocacy on
behalf of a black lessee in Sullivan was discrimination on the
basis of race."°
In the second part of her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the majority's holding was "in step with" the Court's
holding in Sandoval that Congress intended Title IX to prohibit only
intentional discrimination, and therefore, its implied private cause
of action was not available to enforce disparate-impact regulations
adopted by the Department of Education to effectuate Title IX's
purpose.11 ° Specifically, she wrote, "[w]e do not rely on regulations
extending Title IX's protection beyond its statutory limits; indeed,
we do not rely on the Department of Education's regulation at all,
because the statute itself contains the necessary prohibition.""'
In the third part of her opinion, Justice O'Connor discussed two
points. She rejected the contention that Jackson was entitled to
invoke the implied cause of action "because he [was] an 'indirect
victi[m]' of sex discrimination." 2 She noted:
The statute is broadly worded; it does not require that the victim
of the retaliation must also be the victim of the discrimination
that is the subject of the original complaint. If the statute
provided instead that "no person shall be subjected to discrimi-
nation on the basis of such individual's sex," then we would
agree with the Board. However, Title IX contains no such
limitation. Where the retaliation occurs because the complainant
108. Id. at 1506.
109. Id. at 1505-06 (quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 699 (1979))
(alterations in original).
110. Id. at 1507.
111. Id. at 1506-07.
112. Id. (alteration in original).
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speaks out about sex discrimination, the "on the basis of sex
requirement is satisfied.113
As a second point, Justice O'Connor noted that Congress's
objective in enacting Title IX of "provid[ing] individual citizens
effective protection against [discriminatory] practices,. . . 'would be
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complain about
sex discrimination did not have effective protection against retalia-
tion.""14 She reasoned that third party reporting and complaining
to school authorities is an essential part of the public enforcement
process and that "if retaliation were not prohibited, Title IX's
enforcement scheme would unravel."" 5 This conclusion was based
on the constraint that neither individuals nor agencies may bring
suit under Title IX unless the recipient has received "actual notice"
of the discrimination:1 6
If recipients were able to avoid such notice by retaliating against
all those who dare complain, the statute's enforcement scheme
would be subverted. We should not assume that Congress left
such a gap in its scheme.
... [S]ometimes adult employees are the "only effective
adversar[ies]" of discrimination in schools.11v
In the last section of her majority opinion, Justice O'Connor
concluded that recipients of federal financial assistance had clear
notice about potential retaliation liability since the Court held in
Cannon in 1979 that an implied private cause of action exists under
Title IX to enforce its prohibition against intentional discrimination
on the basis of sex:118
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1508 (quoting Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 13, Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1497 (No. 02-1672)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,237 (1969)). This
reasoning ignores the dissent's contention that the students and their parents could
protest to school authorities or in the alternative complain to the Office of Civil Rights
of the Department of Education and request an investigation.
118. Id. at 1509. The reasoning for this conclusion was based upon prior decisions:
[I]n Davis, we held that Pennhurst did not pose an obstacle to private
suits for damages in cases of a recipient's deliberate indifference to one
student's sexual harassment of another, because the deliberate indifference
constituted intentional discrimination on the basis of sex. Similarly, we held
in Gebser that a recipient of federal funding could be held liable for damages
under Title IX for deliberate indifference to a teacher's harassment of a
student. In Gebser, as in Davis, we acknowledged that federal funding
recipients must have notice that they will be held liable for damages.
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[T]he Board should have been put on notice by the fact that
our cases since Cannon, such as Gebser and Davis, have
consistently interpreted Title IX's private cause of action broadly
to encompass diverse forms of intentional sex discrimination.
Indeed, retaliation presents an even easier case than deliberate
indifference. It is easily attributable to the funding recipient,
and it is always - by definition - intentional. We therefore
conclude that retaliation against individuals because they
complain of sex discrimination is "intentional conduct that
violates the clear terms of the statute," and that Title IX itself
therefore supplied sufficient notice to the Board that it could not
retaliate against Jackson after he complained of discrimination
against the girls' basketball team.119
V. JUSTICE THOMAS'S DISSENT: THE TEXTUALIST APPROACH 120
Justice Thomas's dissent consists of five principal points: (1) the
meaning of "on the basis of sex" refers exclusively to the sex of direct
victims and, therefore, the meaning of discrimination does not
include retaliation;'21 (2) the precedent on the notice requirement of
the Spending Clause requires clarity;122 (3) precedent requires
evidence of congressional intent in order to find an implied cause of
action; 12 (4) Sullivan does not apply;'24 and (5) the court's role is
limited to examining the text.
125
First, Justice Thomas argued that the natural meaning of "on
the basis of sex" is on the basis of the plaintiffs sex and not the sex
of some other person. 26 '"On the basis of sex' [is] shorthand for...
'on the basis of such individual's sex.""27 Justice Thomas differenti-
ates the Jackson case from the Court's past inclusion of sexual
Id. (citations omitted).
119. Id. at 1509-10 (citation omitted).
120. Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Scalia joined the dissent.
Id. at 1510.
121. Id. at 1510-11 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
122. Id. at 1515.
123. Id. at 1514. In the second part of his dissent, Justice Thomas asserted:
The Court's holding is also inconsistent with two lines of this Court's
precedent: Our rule that Congress must speak with a clear voice when it
imposes liability on the States through its spending power and our refusal
to imply a cause of action when Congress' intent to create a right or remedy
is not evident.
Id.
124. Id. at 1516.
125. Id. at 1515.
126. Id. at 1511.
127. Id.
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harassment cases in the scope of the implied private cause of
action.128 In the sexual harassment cases, the discrimination com-
plained of was that of the complainants; therefore, those holdings
are not inconsistent with Justice Thomas's interpretation of the
Jackson case.'29
Jackson's assertion... fails to allege sex discrimination in
this sense. Jackson does not claim that his own sex played any
role... in the decision to relieve him of his position....
Jackson's lawsuit therefore differs fundamentally from
other examples of sex discrimination, like sexual harassment. A
victim of sexual harassment suffers discrimination because of
her own sex, not someone else's."'
In addition, "Jackson's retaliation claim lacks the connection to
actual sex discrimination that the statute requires. Jackson claims
that he suffered reprisal because he complained about sex discrimi-
nation, not that the sex discrimination underlying his complaint
occurred."'' Imposing retaliation liability expands the statute
beyond discrimination on the basis of sex to instances in which no
discrimination on the basis of sex has occurred, since all that is
required is a good faith reasonable belief that sex discrimination has
occurred rather than proof that it has.'32 The complaint was not
about discrimination, which may not have ever occurred, but about
retaliation, which "is not based on anyone's sex, much less the
complainer's sex." 3
At bottom .... retaliation is a claim that aids in enforcing
another separate and distinct right .... To describe retaliation
as discrimination on the basis of sex is to conflate the enforce-
ment mechanism with the right itself. . .."
Thus, Justice Thomas's argument rests on the following
reasoning. The language of Title VI, contrasted with that of Title
VII, indicates that retaliation is different from discrimination.
Neither Title VI nor Title IX mentions retaliation, but Title VII, the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), and the Americans
128. Id. at 1512.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1511-12 (citation omitted).
131. Id. at 1512.
132. Id. at 1513.
133. Id.
134. Id.
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with Disabilities Act (ADA) all have express anti-retaliation
provisions.'35 That the text of Title IX does not mention retaliation
is significant in light of the contrast with Title VII and other
discrimination statutes:
Congress' failure to include similar text in Title IX shows that it
did not authorize private retaliation actions....
Even apart from Title VII, Congress expressly prohibited
retaliation in other discrimination statutes [such as the ADEA
and ADA]. If a prohibition on "discrimination" plainly encom-
passes retaliation, the explicit reference to it in these statutes,
as well as in Title VII, would be superfluous - a result we
eschew in statutory interpretation. The better explanation is
that when Congress intends to include a prohibition against
retaliation in a statute, it does so.
136
Second, Justice Thomas reasoned that because Title IX is a
Spending Clause statute, the language in the statute must provide
clear notice as to the recipients' legal obligations:' 37
Congress must speak with a clear voice when it imposes liability
on the States through its spending power ....
... Such legislation is "in the nature of a contract" and
funding recipients' acceptance of the terms of that contract must
be "voluntar[y]" and "knowin[g]." For their acceptance to be
voluntary and knowing, funding recipients must "have notice of
their potential liability"[,] ... and a condition must be imposed
"unambiguously." 
"
Further, according to Justice Thomas, ambiguity should be resolved
in favor of the recipient.
The majority points out that the statute does not say: "[No
person shall be subject to discrimination on the basis of such
individual's sex." But this reasoning puts the analysis back-
wards. The question is not whether Congress clearly excluded
retaliation claims under Title IX, but whether it clearly included
them. The majority's statement at best points to ambiguity in
135. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2005); Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2005); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2005); see also Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1513.
136. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1513-14 (citations omitted).
137. Id. at 1514.
138. Id. (citations omitted).
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the statute; yet ambiguity is [to be] resolved in favor of the
States .1.3."9
Third, Justice Thomas considered "the standard we have set for
implying causes of action to enforce federal statutes." To recognize
a right created in the statute, the right '"must be phrased in terms
of the person benefited."' 140 Thus, for Justice Thomas the inquiry
was whether Jackson was a member of the class of people the
statute benefited."' Elaborating on this point, he wrote:
This Court has held that these principles apply equally
when the Court has previously found that the statute in
question provides an implied right of action and a party at-
tempts to expand the class of persons or the conduct to which
the recognized action applies. More specifically, this Court has
rejected the creation of implied causes of action for ancillary
claims like retaliation.142
Justice Thomas relied on precedent from Central Bank of
Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.14 3 to support
his opinion. Central Bank concerned the statutory interpretation of
a provision of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.114 The issue was
whether the statute allowed for a civil action against aiders and
abettors, even though it made no specific reference to aiding and
abetting. 14 The Court in Central Bank construed the statute to
exclude a cause of action against those who aid and abet.146 Justice
Thomas used the same statutory construction approach to construe
the Jackson case:
The same reasons militate equally against extending the
implied cause of action under Title IX to retaliation claims. As
in Central Bank, imposing retaliation liability expands the
statute beyond discrimination "on the basis of sex" to instances
in which no discrimination on the basis of sex has occurred.
Again, § 901 protects individuals only from discrimination on the
basis of their own sex. Thus, extending the implied cause of
action under Title IX to claims of retaliation expands the class
139. Id. (citation omitted).
140. Id. at 1515 (quoting Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284 (2002)).
141. Id.
142. Id. (citations omitted).
143. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
144. Id. at 157.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 177.
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of people the statute protects beyond the specified beneficiaries.
... And like the aiding and abetting liability in Central Bank,
prevailing on a claim of retaliation lacks elements necessary to
prevailing on a claim of discrimination on the basis of sex, for no
sex discrimination need have occurred.
147
Fourth, Justice Thomas contended that the majority's reliance
on Sullivan was misplaced:
Rather than holding that a general prohibition against discrimi-
nation permitted a claim of retaliation, Sullivan held that a
white lessor had standing to assert the right of a black lessee to
be free from racial discrimination pursuant to [42 U.S.C. § 1982],
... a statute enacted pursuant to Congress' Thirteenth Amend-
ment enforcement power, not its spending power. Sullivan
therefore says nothing about whether Title IX clearly conditions
States' receipt of federal funds on retaliation liability. 1
Fifth, Justice Thomas argued that Congress's choice of one
enforcement method meant that it did not intend another as well.149
According to his reasoning, Congress creates the right, and Con-
gress provides for the way in which the right will be enforced. He
argued:
Our role, then, is not '"to provide such remedies as are necessary
to make effective the congressional purpose' expressed by a
statute," but to examine the text of what Congress enacted into
law.
Nothing prevents students - or their parents - from complain-
ing about inequality in facilities or treatment....
By crafting it own additional enforcement mechanism, the
majority returns this Court to the days in which it created
remedies out of whole cloth to effectuate its vision of congres-
sional purpose. In doing so, the majority substitutes its policy
judgments for the bargains struck by Congress, as reflected in
the statute's texts. The question before us is only whether Title
IX prohibits retaliation, not whether prohibiting is good policy."5
147. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1515-16.
148. Id. at 1516 (citations omitted).
149. See id. at 1515.
150. Id. at 1517.
2006]
692 WILLIAM AND MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 12:671
For the dissent, any necessity to effectuate purpose would not be
conclusive about intent to extend a private remedy.' The Court
considered whether Congress's creation of a right automatically
implies that Congress intended to create an implicit enforcement
mechanism necessary to effectuate that right, particularly when it
provided an express public enforcement mechanism. 52 According to
the dissent, the public enforcement mechanism may or may not be
adequate, but that does not mean that Congress intended to imply
a private cause of action.
153
VI. COMPETING HERMENEUTICAL APPROACHES
On the principal question, the hermeneutical divide is clear. For
the majority, the word "discrimination" includes all forms of
intentional discrimination, among which is retaliation for protesting
against discrimination.' The majority relied principally on the
1969 Sullivan precedent as authority for this interpretation.'55 In
the majority's view, Sullivan was relevant and critically important
for two reasons. First, the Court in Sullivan held that a statutory
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of race included the
right of a white person to sue for compensation for retaliation for
protesting against racial discrimination violative of the statute. 156
Second, Sullivan was decided in 1969, only three years before
Congress enacted Title IX; thus, it would have led Congress to
believe that its language in Title IX would also be interpreted in the
same way.1
57
For the dissent, Sullivan was a Spending Clause case on a
standing issue and was, therefore, irrelevant to the Title IX issue
before the Court.55 Retaliation is different from discrimination and,
therefore, not implied as a form of discrimination. 5 9 Retaliation
refers to adverse conduct because of advocacy or protest based on a
good faith, reasonable belief that illegal discrimination has occur-
red."6 Because of this difference, whenever Congress has intended
151. Id.
152. See id. at 1508 (majority opinion).
153. See id. at 1515-16 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 1504 (majority opinion).
155. Id. at 1507.
156. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969).
157. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1506.
158. Id. at 1516 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
159. See id. at 1512-13.
160. Id. at 1512.
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to prohibit retaliation along with discrimination, it has done so
expressly." 1
The majority broadly interpreted the language "on the basis of
sex" to include retaliation where the subject matter of the complaint
is sexual discrimination and the complainer's sex is not part of the
issue.'62 The majority relied on the fact that the text does not
expressly exclude this meaning, stating "[t]he statute is broadly
worded; it does not require that the victim of the retaliation must
also be the victim of the discrimination that is the subject of the
original complaint.16 The complainant is himself a victim of
discriminatory retaliation, regardless of whether he was a victim in
the original complaint. The dissent insisted on what it termed "the
natural meaning" of this phrase as shorthand for "such individual's
sex," a "natural meaning" confirmed by the earlier Title IX case on
sexual harassment. 1'
A second divisive issue was the inference to be drawn from the
differences between Title VII and Title IX.'65 Since Title IX is in pari
materia with Title VI, this issue relies by analogy on Title VI, which
was enacted, like Title VII, as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.166
Congress's constitutional authority for enacting Title VII is the
Commerce Clause,161 whereas its authority for enacting Title VI and
Title IX is the Spending Clause. 6 ' Title VII specifically describes
the prohibited discrimination, whereas Title VI contains a generic
description.'69 Their enforcement schemes differ. Title VII contains
express anti-retaliation provisions and creates an express private
cause of action available to complainants after they have first filed
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 7 ° whereas
161. See id. at 1513.
162. Id. at 1509 (majority opinion).
163. Id.
164. See id. at 1512-13 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. Id. at 1505 (majority opinion), 1513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
166. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
167. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 701 (b), (d), 703, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, 2000e-2 (2005)).
168. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508 ("Title IX was enacted as an exercise of Congress'
powers under the Spending Clause .... ."); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185 (2002)
("Title VI invokes Congress's power under the Spending Clause...."); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,367 (1978) ("Title VII rests on the Commerce Clause
power....").
169. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,252
(1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2005)); Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972 § 901, Pub. L. No. 92-318, 85 Stat. 235, 373 (1972) (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2005)).
170. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1505.
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Title VI has only an agency enforcement process in the statute.
171
The dissent reasoned that because Congress included express anti-
retaliation and private cause of action provisions under Title VII
and did not include these under Title VI, Congress understood
"discrimination" not to include "retaliation" and did not intend to
enforce Title VI's prohibition by a private cause of action. 172 The
majority argued that "[blecause Congress did not list any specific
discriminatory practices when it wrote Title IX, its failure to
mention one such practice does not tell us anything about whether
it intended that practice to be covered." 1
73
A third issue was whether the Spending Clause "clear notice"
requirement was met. 74 In the majority's view, the statute itself,
the regulations implementing it, and the cases decided under it
clearly provided the notice required under the Spending Clause.
175
In the dissent's view, at the very least there has been an ambiguity
about retaliation liability and that ambiguity should be resolved in
favor of the recipients of federal financial assistance.
76
A fourth issue dividing the Court was the relevance of Sandoval
to the legal issue. Both sides acknowledged that Sandoval held that
a private right of action is not implied to enforce disparate-impact
regulations adopted under Title VI. 77 Both sides also agreed that
the Sandoval Court's reasons for this outcome were that Title VI
prohibits only intentional discrimination, that there is an implied
private cause of action created by Title VI's rights-creating language
to enforce this prohibition, and that this cause of action does not
extend to disparate-impact activities prohibited by the regulation
but permissible under the statute. 78 What divided the justices was
that, in addition to the above, the Sandoval Court also articulated
statutory rules of interpretation to determine the existence and the
scope of implied private causes of action.179 The Jackson majority
focused on the Sandoval holding and the reasoning relevant to that
outcome. 8 ° The majority maintained that its holding was "[i]n step
with Sandoval . . . because retaliation falls within the statute's
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1 (2005).
172. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1513-14 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 1505 (majority opinion).
174. See id. at 1508-09.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1514 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1506 (majority opinion), 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1506 (majority opinion); see id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
179. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288 & n.7 (2001).
180. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1506-07.
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prohibition of intentional discrimination on the basis of sex." "' For
the dissent, under the approach required by Sandoval and Central
Bank, the text must provide evidence of congressional intent to
extend the implied cause of action to claims of retaliation, including
to complainants beyond the intended beneficiaries.' 82
A fifth issue was the use of Title IX's purposes' as a basis for
finding the extension of the implied cause of action to include
retaliation. For the majority, without effective protection against
retaliation, the objectives of the statute would be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve."M Because the majority deemed the public
enforcement scheme ineffective, it concluded that Congress intended
private enforcement, reasoning that Congress would not create a
statutory right without a remedy.' For the dissent, Congress
expressly provided for the public enforcement of Title IX."8
According to the dissent, the Court itself may or may not prefer
alternative ways to enforce Title IX, but its role is to interpret the
enforcement scheme provided and not to create one Congress did not
provide.87
VII. IMPLICATIONS
For Jackson and those similarly situated, this decision provides
a remedy for retaliation that otherwise might not be available. To
succeed in a private cause of action, victims alleging retaliation
must show: (1) that they complained about discrimination based on
sex to school authorities in a position to remedy it,' (2) that their
complaint was based on a good faith, reasonable belief,'89 (3) that
the authorities took an adverse employment action against them,'9°
and (4) that a causal connection exists between their complaint and
the adverse employment action.'9 '
181. Id. at 1507.
182. See id. at 1515 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
183. "Congress enacted Title IX not only to prevent the use of federal dollars to
support discriminatory practices, but also 'to provide individual citizens effective
protection against those practices."' Id. at 1508 (majority opinion).
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 1510 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005)).
187. Id. at 1516-17 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 1502 (majority opinion); see also Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3e 307, 320 (4th
Cir. 2003).
189. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1512 & n.1 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
190. Id. at 1504 (majority opinion); see also Peters, 327 F.3d at 320.
191. See Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504; see also Peters, 327 F.3d at 320.
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The ultimate beneficiaries of this decision are students,
particularly at the high school level. "[T]eachers and coaches such
as Jackson are often in the best position to vindicate the rights of
their students because they are better able to identify discrimina-
tion and bring it to the attention of administrators." 19 2 Not only may
the students themselves, who are the direct victims of the discrimi-
nation based on sex, complain without fear of retaliation from school
authorities, but now their teachers and coaches likewise may
complain without fear of retaliation.
All educational programs that are recipients of federal financial
assistance under Title IX are now indisputably on notice that they
are liable for retaliation against those who complain in good faith
about discrimination on the basis of sex. Likewise, under Title VI,
in pari materia with Title IX, all recipients, whether educational
programs or not, are on identical notice with regard to those who
complain in good faith about discrimination on the basis of race,
color, or national origin. This decision thus brings these two
Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes in line with the
Commerce Clause statutes (Title VII, ADEA, and ADA) and the
Reconstruction statutes (42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982).
This decision may end the debate on the meaning of "discrimi-
nation on the basis of sex" but not the division within the courts
between textualist and contextualists. Why would a justice choose
one interpretation approach rather than the other? Individual
justices' positions on the hermeneutical divide are a function of each
justice's prior political-economic convictions about the respective
roles of the legislative and judicial branches. The textualist position
expects more from Congress. When statutes are silent or ambiguous
about congressional intent, textualists believe courts should look for
intent only in the text and its structure and should not rely on the
text's original legal context or on its stated purpose.'93 Textualists
believe courts should interpret what Congress said in terms of its
original meaning as the basis for its contemporary application. In
contrast, contextualists, exemplified by the Jackson majority,
clearly rely on the contemporary legal context and the statute's
purpose. 19 4 The contextualist position recognizes the inevitability of
lacunae and ambiguity and of the fact that some situations are
completely overlooked by the enacting Congress.
192. Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1508.
193. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
194. E.g., Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1502-10; see also supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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Intent is and should be determinative. The challenge is to
discover intent when the text is ambiguous or silent regarding the
enacting legislature's intent. Standard rules of statutory construc-
tion have included: the common meaning of the words; prior
decisions interpreting the words; the statutory scheme as a whole,
including purpose (found in text and legislative history); the
interpretation of the enforcing agency (Chevron deference); and the
contemporary legal context.
195
Finally, "'[t]his 5-4 decision also underscores the critical point
that the Court [has been] closely divided .... Every nomination to
the Court can make a tremendous difference in the outcome of real
cases affecting real people for decades to come."" 9 While the
composition of the Court has changed since this decision, it remains
to be seen on which side of the hermeneutical divide Justice Roberts
and Alito fall. The significance of the composition of the court in
terms of textualists or contextualists depends on whether Congress
itself is liberal or conservative. A liberal Congress would respect a
broad interpretation of statutory intent; a conservative Congress, a
narrow one. With a liberal Congress, a textualist majority would
mean that Congress would have to exercise greater care in legislat-
ing and would have to amend statutes whenever it concluded that
the Court was interpreting its intent too narrowly. With a conserva-
tive Congress, a contextualist majority would mean the same. In
light of the ever-changing composition of the Supreme Court, this
hermeneutical divide remains a salient and useful method for
understanding the justices who make up the Court.
195. See generally James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and
the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning (USC Law School and California Institute of
Technology, Center for the Study of Law and Policy, Working Paper No. CSLP-WP-028,
2004), available at http://lawweb.usc.edu/cslp/papers/cslp-wp-028.pdf; see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 834-44 (1984).
196. Press Release, Natl Women's Law Center, supra note 2 (quoting Marcia D.
Greenberger, NWLC Co-President).
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